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“Publicity is a great purifier because it sets in action the forces of
public opinion, and in this country public opinion controls the
courses of the nation.” 1
INTRODUCTION
The 2010-2011 democratic movements in Africa and the Middle
East, dubbed the “Arab Spring,” have borne witness to peaceful
uprisings, bloody civil war, the deaths of civilians and militants, the
removal of tyrants from power, and lingering questions regarding
the future of these countries.2 During such times of turmoil, vio-
lence, and uncertainty, it is unfortunate—but far from surprising
—when there are reports of targeted violence and persecution
against those recording these events.3
In America, by contrast, those with power employ similar tactics
of oppression—but without the pretense of societal chaos as an ex-
cuse. Americans seeking to record public life often find themselves
victims of government suppression. Police have used physical meth-
ods to prevent journalists from recording public protest events
across America, such as “Occupy Wall Street.”4 Police have trained
their guns on unarmed citizens for recording their activities in pub-
lic streets.5 Citizens have been arrested for recording police officers’
public conduct.6 Claims of police destroying recording equipment
1. Charles Evans Hughes, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address to the
Manufacturers’ Association (May 1908), in THE GREAT QUOTATIONS 334, 335 (George Seldes
ed., 1966).
2. See Peter Hartcher, Op-Ed., Sun Sets on Tyranny but Strife Looms on Horizon,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/sun-sets-
on-tyranny-but-strife-looms-on-horizon-20111024-1mgb4.html.
3. E.g., Egypt Targeting Reporters: Press Freedom Group, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26,
2011, 4:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/26/egypt-targeting-reporters_n_
814521.html; Josh Halliday, Gaddafi’s Forces Target International Journalists in Libya,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/25/gaddafi-forces-
target-international-journalists.
4. E.g., Steven M. Ellis, IPI: Journalists Arrested Across the U.S., TR. MEDIA (Nov. 8,
2011, 10:13 AM), http://www.trust.org/trustmedia/news/ipi-journalists-arrested-across-the-us/.
5. Donald R. Winslow, At Gunpoint, Miami Beach Police Threaten Videographer at Fatal
Shooting, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASS’N (June 7, 2011), http://www.nppa.org/news_
and_events/news/2011/06/miami.html.
6. Thomas MacMillan, Top Cop: You’re Arrested for Videotaping Us, NEW HAVEN INDEP.
(Nov. 11, 2010, 11:16 AM), http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/
videotaper_arrested_by_top_police_brass/; Navy Vet Arrested After Taping Police on Cell
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and erasing recorded material are common.7 These events are not
new, they happen often, and they occur throughout America.8
When police subject Americans to such treatment, they act either
on their own authority or pursuant to legislative decree.9 The
United States currently lacks a judicial check on this kind of
suppression.10 To protect against this assault on the acquisition of
knowledge, courts require—and America needs—a properly founded
constitutional protection. The Fourteenth Amendment is the source
of that protection; through it, every American has a fundamental
right to record.
Part I of this Note evaluates the formal intrusion of state author-
ity on the right to record: recording statutes. Part II assesses the
current state of litigation regarding the right to record. By the con-
clusion of these two Parts, this Note will have shown that the
government is restraining the right to record and that the current
legal paradigms are insufficient to truly provide protection. To this
end, Part III engages in a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process analysis of the right to record, ultimately concluding that
such a right is fundamental and therefore protected under substan-
tive due process jurisprudence.
I. A GLIMPSE OF THE PROBLEM
Although the scope of the constitutional right must be devel-
oped,11 the best introduction to the issue is evaluating those statutes
directly limiting the proposed right. This starting point establishes
one avenue of government intrusion and cultivates a better under-
standing of the fundamental right. Forty-nine states12 and the fed-
Phone, WTSP 10 NEWS (July 22, 2011, 6:59 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/topstories/article
/202273/250/Navy-vet-arrested-after-taping-police-on-cell-phone.
7. E.g., Man Sues Baltimore Police for Deleting Cell-Phone Videos, FIRST AMENDMENT
CENTER (Sept. 1, 2011, 10:08 AM), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/man-sues-baltimore-
police-for-deleting-cell-phone-videos; Winslow, supra note 5.
8. See infra notes 52-60, 246-47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III.D.1.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.C.
12. Jesse Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era?: The Need for Safeguards in State
Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 487, 489 n.3 (2011).
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eral government have statutes limiting the ability of private citizens
to record.13 Though the statutes have various names and forms,14
this Note will refer to this type of statute as a “recording statute.”
These recording statutes prevent persons from recording15 elec-
tronic, wireless, and oral communications.16
The history giving rise to these statutes is fairly straightforward.
In the early years of recording technology, states affirmatively
outlawed wiretapping and other means of intercepting private com-
munications.17 In 1967 the Supreme Court weighed in, declaring in
Katz v. United States that “the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places.”18 The Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment
extends to what a person attempts to keep private, even in a pub-
licly accessible place.19 To this end, the Fourth Amendment control-
led when the government electronically listened to and recorded a
telephone conversation held within a glass, public phone booth.20
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion ultimately defined Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence,21 setting forth the oft-cited22 two-part
test for what constitutes a governmental search.23
13. Id. at 533-45.
14. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-304 (2010) (“eavesdropping”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-62
(2011) (“interception”).
15. “Recording” includes “intercept[ion],” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2006), “eavesdropp[ing],”
CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a) (West 2011), and “wiretapping,” id. § 631. “Wiretapping”
traditionally refers to the specific “tapping” of wires to access and record communications.
Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police Conduct, 106
NW. U. L. REV. 273, 280 (2012).
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(b); CAL. PENAL CODE § 632(a); see also Potere, supra
note 15, at 282-83.
17. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 492 (2006).
18. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
19. Id. at 351-52.
20. Id. at 353.
21. Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 842 (1998).
22. E.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001); United States v. Dunn, 480
U.S. 294, 315-18 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211-13
(1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
23. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“There is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
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In direct response to the Court’s holding in Katz,24 Congress
passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.25
This law was more than a response to Katz—it was an expansion.
The Act established a standard regulating more than just govern-
ment conduct or mere wiretapping.26 It pertained to both govern-
ment and private conduct and addressed both the method and
substance of recording.27 In turn, states used this federal legislation
as a model for their legislative agendas and reworked their record-
ing statutes.28 And though these federal and state statutes are not
identical,29 three pertinent elements of a recording statute are
relevant to the right to record: consent, privacy, and secrecy.30
Because each of these elements may vary by jurisdiction, they will
be discussed in turn. 
Consent. Consent in a recording statute pertains to an agreement
by the parties to record the communication. The federal standard
requires that at least one party to the communication consent to the
recording.31 Under this standard, the recording party’s consent is
implied if that party partakes in the communication.32 To the extent
this occurs, this consent requirement is effectively moot because the
recording party will always consent to the recording taking place.
Thirteen states go beyond the federal standard, at least with respect
to some types of recordings, and require that all recorded parties
consent to the recording.33 The recording statutes’ consent element
24. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 28 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2113;
Alderman, supra note 12, at 493 & n.18; see also Bast, supra note 21, at 842-43 (describing
amendments).
25. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006)).
26. See Bast, supra note 21, at 845 & n.83.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
28. See Potere, supra note 15, at 282-83.
29. See Bast, supra note 21, app. at 927-30.
30. Alderman, supra note 12, at 490.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).
32. Id. § 2511(2)(d).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631-632 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to -189a
(West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1335, 2401-2402 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.02-.03
(West 2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/14-1 to -3 (West 2011); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. §§ 10-401 to -402 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99 (West 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.539a-.539e (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2011); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A:1 to :2 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.721, 165.535-.543 (West
2011); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5702-5704 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030
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can therefore be viewed on a three-point spectrum: all party con-
sent, at least one recorded party’s consent, and no consent if the
recording party partakes in the recorded communication.
Privacy. With regard to the recording statutes, privacy is the
ability to have one’s communications kept from others—or at least
off a permanent recording. The federal standard establishes that
there must be an expectation of privacy attached to the communica-
tion for the recording to violate the statute.34 Nine states set a
higher standard by altogether ignoring the privacy expectations and
looking to other elements to ascertain if a recording is illegal.35 This
higher standard may prohibit recording communications that lack
any expectation of privacy, including conversations of public officials
acting in the normal course of their duties.36
Secrecy. Secrecy in recording statutes matters only to the extent
that the recording activity is disclosed to or readily discoverable by
those parties being recorded. The federal standard does not account
for secrecy when ascertaining what recordings are unlawful.37 This
lack of a secrecy element indicates that Congress intended to protect
private communications38 with only consent and privacy consider-
ations. The inferential conclusion, then, is that both surreptitious
and open recordings may violate the statute. Five states deviate
from this standard by prohibiting only those recordings that are
surreptitious.39
These three elements are important because of their substantive
impact on the constitutional right at issue. Consent limits who may
be recorded. Privacy limits where the recording may take place and
the substance of the recording. Secrecy limits the method of
(West 2011).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2); see also S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 11 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178; Alderman, supra note 12, at 493.
35. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 42.20.310 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-187 to
-189; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.010-.030 (West
2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99; MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213; NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 200.610-.690 (West 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-12-1 (West 2011); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 250.00-.05 (McKinney 2011).
36. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967-68 (Mass. 2001).
37. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2511.
38. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 523 (2001).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (West 2011); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.650; OR. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 165.540(6) (West 2010).
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recording. Thus, the statutory landscape is a patchwork of norma-
tive decisions regarding which elements, and in what formulation,
best protect privacy interests. From a broad procedural view, this is
acceptable—even laudable. Legislatures are the arena of policy
making, and individual states are allowed to experiment with their
social values.40
The fault lies in the policymakers’ blind reliance on the standard
set forth by the higher authority. State legislatures shaped their
recording statutes in light of the federal standard,41 which Congress
fashioned to reflect the judicial standard in Katz.42 But the Katz
Court spoke specifically to government actors recording citizens.43
A Fourth Amendment analysis of government wiretapping44 pro-
duced the focus on people instead of places,45 as well as the dev-
elopment of a two-step standard to determine constitutionally
permissible conduct.46 The applicability of such Fourth Amendment
determinations should thus be limited to government actors; the
legality of private conduct is not constrained by Fourth Amendment
boundaries.47 And yet, through these recording statutes, private
conduct is regulated by these very Fourth Amendment restraints on
government action: consent, privacy, and secrecy. This template for
proper government action was inappropriately used as guidance in
constraining private conduct.
Moreover, legislative reliance on the Court’s Fourth Amendment
standards has narrowed the perceived universe of constraints,
allowing legislatures to ignore other constitutional limitations. By
focusing on consent, privacy, and secrecy—the statutory standards
deriving from the Fourth Amendment analysis—legislatures have
ignored other constitutional provisions that they may be violating.
The above critique is not to suggest that every recording statute
is in some way unconstitutional. Different legal standards may
simultaneously and concordantly designate the same conduct per-
40. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579 (1981).
41. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
42. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
44. Id. at 353.
45. Id. at 351.
46. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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missible or impermissible. Although the recording statutes trace
their modern scope to Katz, the boundaries of the constitutional
right to record may fall along similar lines. The right to record is not
without its own limitations. But, until now, only the Katz Fourth
Amendment benchmarks have shaped the ability of citizens to
exercise their right to record. The consequence has been the
inappropriate curtailing of private liberty interests predicated upon
the constitutional constraints of government conduct.
II. CONTEMPORARY FOCUS ON THE RIGHT TO RECORD
The battleground to vindicate the right to record has been in
three general types of litigation. A private individual may have a
state-based cause of action against another party who records that
individual.48 A state may criminally charge an individual with
violating an applicable state recording statute.49 Or a private indi-
vidual may bring action against the government for impermissibly
restricting that citizen’s right to record.50 For the purposes of this
Part, the most salient type of case arises from this final category
and involves a citizen who brings an action for deprivation of rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The nature of a § 1983 action requires the
plaintiff to allege that a state actor deprived that citizen of “any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”51 The
requirement of an affirmatively pled constitutional right makes
this type of litigation fertile ground to explore the boundaries of
state infringement upon constitutional freedoms. As will be shown,
the focus of these actions has been on First Amendment concerns,
whereas the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process con-
siderations are almost nonexistent.
48. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 863 So. 2d 156, 162 (Fla. 2003) (pursuing a
common law claim); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895
P.2d 1269, 1278 (Nev. 1995) (proceeding under a statutory cause of action).
49. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 964-65 (Mass. 2001).
50. See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 538-40 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
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A. First Amendment Litigation
In pertinent § 1983 actions, the conduct central to each dispute is
a public official preventing a private citizen from using some
device—visual, audio, or a combination thereof—to record another
person.52 The vast majority of legal arguments stemming from this
litigation focus on whether the First Amendment protects the action
of recording,53 and the academic discourse tracks this focus.54
Each link of the “chain of communication,”55 from the act of re-
cording to delivering the recording to an audience, contains a
different theory of First Amendment protection. The relevant First
Amendment argument therefore depends upon the threshold deter-
mination of what stage in the recording process an individual’s
conduct enjoys the aegis of First Amendment protection. The ear-
liest possible stage of recording is when a party captures an obser-
vation with a recording device. At this point, the theories of First
Amendment protection are either a general right to gather informa-
tion56 or an essential aspect of the more specific right to petition.57
The next stage of recording involves the ability of the observer to
communicate. The theory of First Amendment protection at this
52. See, e.g., Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1999) (arrest for videotaping
meeting in town hall); Bloom v. Levy, No. 97-7549, 1998 WL 536395, at *1 (2d Cir. June 11,
1998) (threatened destruction of video camera); Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438-40
(9th Cir. 1995) (arrest for nonconsensual videotaping of public protest bystanders); Matheny
v. Cnty. of Allegheny Pa., No. 09-1070, 2010 WL 1007859, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010)
(arrest for recording police officers’ conversation); Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 538-40 (arrest
for videotaping state troopers inspecting trucks).
53. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Borough of
Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2010); Fordyce, 55 F.3d at 438.
54. See sources cited infra notes 55-60.
55. Seth Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse,
and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 382-83 (2011).
56. See Barry P. McDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of Information:
Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information in the Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249,
339-55 (2004); Lisa Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the
Massachusetts Anti-Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of
Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981, 1004-06 (2009). Compare, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at
82-83, Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000), and Iacobucci, 193
F.3d at 25, with Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
57. See Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 661, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); see
also Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights
Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 656-60 (2009).
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point asserts a constitutional right to convey an inherently expres-
sive message,58 which may be narrowed to a prior restraint claim.59
The final stage of recording relates to the audience receiving the
recording. At this point, the First Amendment protection focuses on
the audience rather than the recording party by framing the
recording as an essential aspect of the public’s right to receive
information.60
Even when the right has been framed under a particular First
Amendment theory, the government may restrict that right to a
reasonable time, manner, and place.61 In § 1983 actions to date, the
question of what will clear this hurdle of reasonableness is deter-
mined only by those facts before each court.62 The relatively few
cases bearing upon the right to record therefore fail to sufficiently
trace the full extent of constitutionally protected conduct. This
produces a doctrinal inadequacy, whereby the judicial lines tracing
the right are either insufficient or simply in the wrong places.
A critical view of this First Amendment litigation also reveals the
deficiency in terms of litigation strategy. There is no clear, single
basis upon which this right can be litigated under the First
Amendment. The result is fractured theories about how to define
the right,63 which have expanded into a disjointed consensus re-
garding whether a right actually exists—much less to what extent.64
This splintering of the underlying theory and its appropriate scope
has had ripple effects in terms of its practical success, so that au-
thority is split across jurisdictions in establishing both the underly-
58. See Kreimer, supra note 55, at 370-74. Compare Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14
(3d Cir. 2005), with Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, No. 10 C 5235, 2011 WL
66030, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011), and Pomykacz v. Borough of W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp.
2d 504, 513 n.14 (D.N.J. 2006).
59. See Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005); see also Potere,
supra note 15, at 302-12.
60. See Glik, 655 F.3d at 82; see also Alderman, supra note 12, at 519-25.
61. E.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 84; Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir.
2010).
62. See, e.g., Glik, 655 F.3d at 84-85 (establishing that this determination is a case-by-case
inquiry).
63. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. Other litigation further complicates this
doctrine. See, e.g., Gritzke v. M.R.A. Holding, LLC, No. 4:01CV495-RH, 2002 WL 32107540,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2002) (private action); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 967-
68 (Mass. 2001) (criminal action).
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ing right and the situations in which it is protected.65 Ultimately,
the doctrinal failings necessarily produce litigation strategy issues:
the First Amendment cannot provide a clear or unified avenue of
assault against infringement of the right to record.
Considering the above, the First Amendment is not the vehicle to
protect and enforce the right to record. It is therefore appropriate to
look for other constitutional alternatives to uphold this right. Such
a constitutional alternative may provide a uniform theory of pro-
tected conduct, fill in the gaps of First Amendment litigation, and
fully establish the appropriate scope of the right to record. The
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause can provide these
solutions.66
B. Fourteenth Amendment Litigation
Compared to the litigated First Amendment issues, the black ink
of judicial and academic opinion has left the canvas of Fourteenth
Amendment protection all but blank. Only a few courts have as-
sessed whether a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process
right to record exists. Exposing the dearth of attention paid to the
Fourteenth Amendment underscores the need for this Note to fully
flesh out the substantive due process right as discussed below.67
The court in Horen v. Board of Education spoke most on point
regarding a substantive due process right to record.68 The plaintiff-
appellants, parents of a ten-year-old child with various disabilities,
had a prolonged and contentious relationship with various defen-
dants, including the local school district.69 The parties repeatedly
convened with the intent to draft an Individual Educational Plan so
that the student could return to school.70 But because the parents
wanted to record these meetings and the school district did not, the
65. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
66. It is unclear if Fourteenth Amendment protection can be coextensive with other
constitutional provisions. See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court’s “Jot for Jot”
Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1086, 1097-98 (1998). Compare Cnty.
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998), with United States v. James Daniel Good
Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1993) (discussing Fifth Amendment due process).
67. See infra Part III.
68. 594 F. Supp. 2d 833 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
69. Id. at 839.
70. Id.
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parties failed to develop an educational plan.71 The Toledo Public
Schools thereafter filed an administrative complaint and an
Impartial Hearing Officer granted, in pertinent part, their request
to ban the parents’ audio or video recordings of the meetings with-
out prior consent of all involved parties.72 A subsequent appeal
brought the parties before the United States District Court,73 which
considered the parents’ claims—including that of a substantive due
process right to record the Individual Education Plan meetings.74
The Horen court dismissed this claim by focusing on two substan-
tive due process interests.75 First, the court reasoned that because
no constitutional right to education exists, the parents retained no
apparent constitutional right to attend and record the educational
meetings.76 The ability to record, then, could draw constitutional
authority from the ability to attend the educational meetings, but
only if that underlying ability was itself constitutionally guaran-
teed. And because attending educational meetings was not protected
by a specific constitutional provision, no constitutional right to
record the educational meetings existed.77
The court next shifted its focus to an alternative substantive due
process interest and found, once more, the plaintiffs’ position
wanting. The court declared that requiring all parties to consent to
the recording, and the Toledo Public Schools’ subsequent denial of
consent, was not such an “abuse of power that ‘shocks the con-
71. Id.
72. Id. at 839-40.
73. Id. at 840.
74. Id. at 843-44.
75. See id. at 844.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 843-44. When there is no constitutional right being violated, government
infringement on an individual’s liberty interest is subjected to rationale basis scrutiny. See
infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text. A few courts have assessed whether government
infringement of the right to record is permissible under this level of judicial scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Twp. of W. Whiteland, No. 96-8086, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16313,
at *22 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 1997) (holding that an executive officer prohibiting an individual
from recording a Planning Commission meeting survived rational basis review); Order at 12,
Illinois v. Drew, No. 10-CR-00046 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 2012) (holding that 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/14 (West 2011) is unconstitutional under a rational basis analysis of substantive
due process because the statute “lacks a culpable mental state and subjects wholly innocent
conduct to prosecution”); Order on Motion to Declare 720 ILSC 5/14 Unconstitutional, Illinois
v. Allison, No. 2009-CF-50 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 15, 2011) (same), available at http://iln.isba.org/
sites/default/files/blog/2011/09/Cell%20phones%20and%20eavesdropping/Allison%20order.pdf.
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science.’”78 Thus decided, the court moved on to the plaintiffs’ other
claims, presumably finding the substantive due process claim
thoroughly explored.
The Horen court devoted a total of ten sentences to the substan-
tive due process analysis;79 to qualify this rumination on the right
to record as lacking would be an understatement. Yet this is repre-
sentative of the total lack of ammunition a citizen currently has at
her disposal if she wishes to validate her Fourteenth Amendment
right to record. If substantive due process jurisprudence is to
provide grounds to protect this right, further development of the
right to record is necessary. This Note provides the first step of an
admittedly arduous journey.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect citizens from
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”80 Procedural due process is the literal application of this
language and prohibits those processes that deprive life, liberty, or
property but lack sufficiently equitable procedures to protect those
interests.81 Parallel to this procedural protection is the concept of
substantive due process: that some life, liberty, and property inter-
ests are so fundamental that no process, regardless of its procedural
protections, could constitutionally result in their deprivation.82 It is
to substantive due process that this Note now turns. As the Horen
court noted, there are three types of individual interests that
substantive due process protects,83 each of which is discussed below.
78. Horen, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 844 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998)).
79. See id. at 843-44.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
81. See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE
L.J. 408, 419 (2010).
82. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); see also Williams, supra note
81, at 419.
83. See Horen, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
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A. Interests Protected by Substantive Due Process
1. Existing Constitutional Rights
The first substantive due process interest is the protection
against government infringement upon constitutional rights spe-
cifically guaranteed outside the Due Process Clause.84 Applying this
substantive due process interest to the right to record would root the
constitutional protection for the right in an alternate section of the
Constitution—such as the First Amendment.85 The Due Process
Clause would then apply that protection against state action.
Because such an application of substantive due process establishes
the source of protection outside of the Due Process Clause, this
substantive due process interest is beyond the scope of this Note.
This Note does not use the Due Process Clause merely as a means
to apply the protections found elsewhere in the Constitution to the
right to record. The Due Process Clause is the source of that fun-
damental right. It is therefore prudent to look to the alternative
interests protected by substantive due process.
2. Egregious Executive Conduct
The second substantive due process interest is the protection
against government action that is so egregious that it “shock[s] the
conscience”86 and fails to “respect certain decencies of civilized
conduct.”87 Although this may appear to focus on the process of
government action, the Court has held that this is an application of
substantive due process.88 The “shocks the conscience” test is the
84. McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030-31 (2010) (plurality opinion). The
Horen court appeared to apply a modified version of this analysis. See supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text. This trends closely to protecting the penumbras of enumerated rights, see
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965), but some claim that the Court has
discarded the concept of penumbras for substantive due process purposes, see, e.g., Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594-95 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Aaron J. Shuler, From
Immutable to Existential: Protecting Who We Are and Who We Want to Be with the “Equalerty”
of the Substantive Due Process Clause, 12 J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 220, 268-70 (2010).
85. See supra Part II.A.
86. Horen, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
87. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
88. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-47 (1998).
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manifestation of substantive due process protection only against
arbitrary executive conduct.89
Applying this substantive due process interest to the right to
record is possible. Executive conduct has infringed upon the right to
record.90 But this Note intends to establish that the right to record
is itself fundamental, rather than that a particular executive
action is unconstitutional. This analysis will avoid the distraction
of focusing on a single type of executive conduct. Such a narrow
focus would ignore not only existing legislative conduct,91 but it
might also fail to address other methods of executive conduct that
may impermissibly infringe upon the right. This substantive due
process interest is therefore put to the side.
3. Nontextual Constitutional Rights
The final, and perhaps the most controversial,92 substantive due
process interest is establishing those liberty interests not found in
the Constitution’s text but deemed to be of such a fundamental
nature that they are afforded constitutional protection.93 The Court,
by and large, continues to be receptive to the fact that substantive
due process can identify unenumerated rights.94 Paired with this
recognition is the well-founded principle of judicial restraint, which
arises from intertwining concerns. The first of these concerns is an
apprehension regarding the judiciary’s legitimacy when invalidating
89. Id. at 846; see also Martinez v. Cui, 608 F.3d 54, 63-64 (1st Cir. 2010). See generally
Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 529-35 (2008).
90. See supra notes 4-7, 52-60; infra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
91. See supra Part I.
92. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 81, at 408, 411 & nn.1-7.
93. See generally Shuler, supra note 84, at 239-62 (discussing the history of substantive
due process).
94. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); Peter J. Rubin, Square
Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the Bill of
Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 836-38 (2003). Recent cases are informative. Justice Thomas
does not support substantive due process arguments. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct.
3020, 3062 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Justice Scalia has
harangued substantive due process but appears open to the “historical tradition” analysis. See
Nat’l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 765 (2011) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text (describing the historical
tradition analysis).
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“democratically-enacted legislation” based upon the limited means
of precise standards.95 The second is a fear of judges having free
reign to “impose their own personal preferences instead of engaging
in the proper judicial role” of a neutral and detached arbiter.96 These
concerns make the Court hesitant to establish additional nontextual
constitutional rights; nonetheless it remains open to the possi-
bility.97 Even in the face of this reluctance, it is this substantive due
process interest that best protects the right to record.
B. Generality and Scope of the Liberty Interest
Before determining whether a liberty interest is a nontextual
constitutional right, that liberty interest must first be adequately
defined. This Note asserts that recording statutes go too far in
restricting the constitutional right,98 and that First Amendment liti-
gation is unable to go far enough in protecting the full extent of the
right to record.99 A substantive due process analysis, as called for in
this Note, requires more: there must be an affirmative right, and
merely labeling it the “right to record” is insufficient.
The Court has counseled for “careful description of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest”100 in order to justify constitutional
protection of the interest in light of the concerns underlying the
finding of nontextual rights.101 The Court has been loath to provide
any firm guidance as to how to describe a right carefully. The focus
on the implications of establishing a nontextual right indicates that
the description should at least be precise enough to avoid unin-
tended consequences.102
A few Justices have indicated that a proper description requires
framing the right at the “most specific level [of generality] at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the as-
95. Rubin, supra note 94, at 837 & n.17.
96. Id. at 837.
97. Id. at 836-38.
98. See supra Part I.
99. See supra Part II.A.
100. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101. See id. at 721; supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21.
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serted right can be identified.”103 This standard provides additional
protection against arbitrary judicial fiat,104 but no controlling
decision has adopted this standard. Criticism of this most-specific-
level standard105 has highlighted its disconnect with Court prece-
dent106 as well as more fundamental problems.107 Regardless of its
flaws and detractors, this standard provides the crucial foundation
to formulate the contours of the right to record. It mitigates con-
cerns that the judiciary makes its own normative values into law,108
and the specificity suggests only a minimal exercise of judicial
action. But this standard is only a starting point. The Court has
encouraged “formulating the interest at stake” in a “precise” manner
while simultaneously deviating from the most specific level of gen-
erality and evaluating broader liberty interests.109
With these considerations acting as guideposts, the right to record
is defined as follows: (1) a private citizen has (2) a fundamental
right to record with a mechanical device all things then observable
by the citizen (3) within public space (4) that are legally observable
by that individual. This right has been separated into four distinct
elements, but the sum of the parts encapsulates the right to record.
The separation merely provides a convenient mechanism to ade-
quately assess the various parts of the right at issue in the following
substantive due process analysis.
103. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion).
104. See id. But see Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the
Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1093 (1990).
105. See generally John Safranek & Stephen Safranek, Finding Rights Specifically, 111
PENN ST. L. REV. 945, 947 & n.16 (2007).
106. E.g., Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
107. See, e.g., Tribe & Dorf, supra note 104, at 1086. But see Safranek & Safranek, supra
note 105, at 966-76.
108. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3057-58 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
But see Tribe & Dorf, supra note 104, at 1095-96.
109. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-23 (1997).
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C. The Nontextual Right Analysis: Establishing the Liberty  
Interest as Fundamental
The analysis for ascertaining whether a nontextual liberty
interest is constitutionally protected as a fundamental right shapes
the framework of this Section. The Court has implemented two
methods of identifying fundamental rights, both of which are now
reviewed.
One method is labeled a “reasoned judgment” analysis,110 whereby
the Court identifies as fundamental those “personal liberties that it
deems appropriate for our contemporary society.”111 Criticisms of
this approach are fairly self-evident in light of the prudential con-
cerns noted above.112 They include charges of violating the separa-
tion of powers, judicial activism, and an impermissible return to
subjectively implemented natural law.113 Yet the Court has used the
“reasoned judgment” analysis time and again to designate liberty
interests as fundamental rights. This includes establishing the right
of individuals to marry another person without the limitation of
“invidious racial discriminations,”114 the right of a woman to termin-
ate her pregnancy,115 and the right of individuals to engage in pri-
vate sexual conduct without government interference.116
The alternative method is one of “historical tradition,”117 whereby
the Court “test[s] the asserted claim of constitutional protection ...
against the Nation’s traditional treatment of the claim.”118 The
historical tradition analysis is more narrow than the reasoned judg-
ment approach,119 but this is a positive for its advocates: it provides
real limitations on judicial action in light of the prudential concerns
110. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63,
98-106 (2006).
111. Id. at 107.
112. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
113. See Shuler, supra note 84, at 260-61. But see Conkle, supra note 110, at 106-15.
114. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see also Shuler, supra note 84, at 263-64.
115. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870-78 (1992) (plurality
opinion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Conkle,
supra note 110, at 100-05; Shuler, supra note 84, at 267-68, 298-300.
116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
117. See Conkle, supra note 110, at 83-90.
118. See id. at 92.
119. Id. at 87-88.
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underlying the establishment of a nontextual right.120 As a result,
those Justices who appear most hesitant to engage in identifying
nontextual rights have adopted the historical tradition analysis.121
Implementation of this method has established a right to live with
those family members of one’s own choosing.122 More notable may be
those liberty interests to which the historical tradition analysis has
denied status as a fundamental right. This includes the freedom of
an individual to engage in homosexual sodomy,123 the ability of an
individual to be awarded parental rights by the state when that
individual is all but certain to be the father of a child conceived as
part of an adulterous affair,124 and the access to physician-assisted
suicide.125
The Court has used both the reasoned judgment and historical
tradition methods of analysis to evaluate substantive due process
claims. Though this treatment produces sometimes inconsistent re-
sults,126 the Court has yet to invalidate either analytical method.127
It is therefore left to litigants and the lower courts to decide which
method to actually employ. In considering these two methods, this
Note employs a pragmatic strategy by utilizing the analysis that
appears to have the broader appeal. Because of that method’s inter-
nally imposed limitation, as well as the contemporary Court’s
predilection towards it, the remainder of this Section will reflect an
application of the “historical tradition” analysis of the right to
record.128
120. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 & n.12 (1932) (plurality opinion).
121. See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122
(1989) (plurality opinion).
122. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505-06; see also Conkle, supra note 110, at 84-85.
123. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-95; see also Conkle, supra note 110, at 87; Shuler, supra note
84, at 285-87.
124. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-14, 124-27; see also Shuler, supra note 84, at 295-96.
125. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; see also Conkle, supra note 110, at 88-90; Shuler, supra
note 84, at 306-08.
126. Compare supra note 116 (reasoned judgment analysis protecting all private sexual
conduct), with supra note 123 (historical tradition analysis refusing constitutional protection
of a specific, private sexual act).
127. See Conkle, supra note 110, at 82-83.
128. See supra notes 94, 121 and accompanying text.
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The historical tradition method distinguishes as fundamental
those liberty interests that are so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition”129 that they are “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.”130 Each element of the right to record will be
analyzed under this standard in the following Subsections, so that
each aspect of the right to record will be shown to be a deeply rooted
American tradition. This process will establish the liberty interest
as fundamental.
1. Private Citizens
Only private citizens can benefit from the constitutionally pro-
tected right to record. Although subsequent Sections of this Note
will explain why private citizens retain the right,131 it must first be
established who does not fall within the purview of this category:
state agents. As a general matter, there has long been a clear dis-
tinction between the identities of public and private actors—
established well before America’s founding.132
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence reflects this generally
accepted divide. In its initial reviews of Fourteenth Amendment
application, the Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects against certain conduct of state actors and not private
persons.133 This strand of jurisprudence eventually developed into
the formal legal theory of state action,134 with the underlying pur-
pose being to “preserv[e] ... individual freedom”; simultaneously, the
legal theory of state action would absolve the state of responsibility
129. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
130.  Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
131. See infra Part III.C.2.
132. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 101-02, 136-38, 157-58 (Shapiro ed., 2003) (1690) (concluding that man in the
state of nature is a private actor; an agent of the commonwealth is a public officer).
133.  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-12 (1883); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346-47 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U.S. 542, 542-43 (1875).
134. This theory was broadly implemented in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1948).
Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New Answers, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 451, 453-54 (2007).
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for “conduct it could not control,” while holding the state responsible
for its own actions.135
This respect for the line drawing between public and private is
maintained when looking at the photonegative of state action. Doing
so shifts the focus away from the party against whom the Four-
teenth Amendment offers protection and towards the party to whom
Fourteenth Amendment rights are afforded. The text of the Due
Process Clause affords protection to “person[s].”136 Although people
are necessarily the officers of the State,137 the Court made it clear in
its earliest decisions that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
rights of private individuals.138 State action doctrine seeks to pre-
serve the freedom of private individuals to act relative to the party
protected by due process. Similarly, due process protection preserves
the freedoms of each individual citizen’s life, liberty, and property
interests.139 The goal in both instances is to shield individual free-
dom.
This allocation of rights is aligned with the general construction
of the Constitution as well as the nature of any constitutionally
declared right.140 Because the Constitution is a source for grants of,
and limitations on, government power, individuals necessarily
retain any liberty right afforded by the Constitution. Therefore, if
public officials wanted to exercise a similar ability to record, the
constitutionality of their conduct would not be subject to the affirm-
atively protected due process liberty interest. That action would,
instead, be measured by the constitutional grants and restraints
imposed upon the exercise of government power.
135. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191
(1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
137. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347.
138. E.g., Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 554.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
140. See Richard J. Peltz, Limited Powers in the Looking-Glass: Otiose Textualism, and an
Empirical Analysis of Other Approaches, When Activists in Private Shopping Centers Claim
State Constitutional Liberties, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 401-02 (2006).
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2. A Right to Record by Mechanical Device
Observation is perceiving physical reality.141 Recording is making
that observation permanent. Recording can be accomplished
naturally or by mechanical device. Although this Fourteenth
Amendment right may intersect with First Amendment protection,
it does so only with regard to the method of capture and not with
regard to the substance of the constitutional protection. That is,
while the First Amendment may extend protection to acquiring and
disseminating a still- or moving-image capture,142 this protection is
present only because the particular recording contained a likely
understood message.143 In contrast, the Fourteenth Amendment
protection of such image captures need not contain any message;
instead, the protection derives from its deep roots in the nation’s
culture and traditions.
Analyzing this element of the right to record with the historical
tradition method requires two separate lines of discussion. First is
a focus on the historical treatment of mechanical recording to show
that, prior to Katz, the American public by and large accepted
citizens mechanically recording their observations in the public
space.144 The discussion will then turn to the tradition of protecting
the natural process of recording.145 Following this evaluation, the
discussion will explain why mechanical recording is sufficiently
similar to natural recording so as to benefit from its longstanding
American support.146
a. The Historical Treatment of Mechanical Recording
The ability to record observations by mechanical device did not
become readily available to the public until the Eastman Kodak
Company invented the inexpensive snap camera in 1884.147 With the
141. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1993).
142. See Kreimer, supra note 55, at 339-41.
143. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
144. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
145. See infra Part III.C.2.b-d.
146. See infra Part III.C.2.e.
147. Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128-29 (2007).
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snap camera, just about any member of the public could easily and
affordably take candid photographs in public.148 The popularity of
the snap camera with the general public was explosive.149 In con-
trast, the bourgeois reacted with abhorrence to the technology’s
undermining of respectability and destruction of social barriers.150
This negative response culminated six years later when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis published the now-infamous article The
Right to Privacy.151 Warren and Brandeis advocated against the
publication of one’s “inviolate personality” through the legal pro-
tection of the individual’s right “to be let alone.”152
At the outset, there was scant legal authority to provide a remedy
to those individuals whose image had been captured.153 But starting
in 1905, state courts began to recognize in haphazard fashion the
Warren and Brandeis right to privacy.154 This adoption was, ini-
tially, a slow burn, whereby only fifteen states recognized the right
to privacy as an actionable tort by 1940.155 By 1950, most states rec-
ognized the privacy tort in at least some form.156 Concurrent with
judicial action, various states passed statutes that focused on indi-
vidual privacy. The first statute to tackle the issue was passed in
New York after the state court of last resort failed to find an
actionable tort when a company used an individual’s image as part
of its trademark without that individual’s consent.157 Other states
such as California, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Utah enacted simi-
lar statutory protections soon thereafter.158
Although these judicial and legislative protections of privacy were
not uniform, their common quality was that they concerned the
148. Id.
149. Robert E. Mensel, “Kodakers Lying in Wait”: Amateur Photography and the Right of
Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 28 (1991).
150. See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Eye That Never Sleeps: Privacy and Law in the
Internet Era, 40 TULSA L. REV. 561, 568-69 (2005); Mensel, supra note 149, at 28-32.
151. See Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 128.
152. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
205 (1890).
153. See DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 58-59 (1972); Mensel, supra note 149, at
35-38; Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 129-33 & n.27.
154. Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 147-48.
155. Id. at 148.
156. Id.
157. See Mensel, supra note 149, at 36-40.
158. PEMBER, supra note 153, at 75-76.
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divulgence of a person’s private information.159 The acquisition
—that is the recording—of the individual’s “inviolate personality”160
was not the focus of the vast majority of these privacy protections.
Indeed, William Prosser, after reviewing the wealth of legal activity
and cataloguing the “contours and limitations” of the right to pri-
vacy in 1960,161 identified only one actionable tort pertaining to
acquisition. This tort depended upon “[i]ntrusion” on an individual’s
“seclusion,” “solitude,” or “private affairs.”162 Prosser made no men-
tion of consent to being recorded or the secrecy of the recording. This
tort provided a cause of action only for recording within an individ-
ual’s home or “in facilities remote from the public.”163 To this extent,
it encompassed privacy—but as defined by places, not by people. It
could be seen as a broad reflection of protecting against the intru-
sion upon communications held in zones of privacy, such as wire-
tapping.164
For all of the handwringing over the individual’s privacy, Amer-
ica’s near-universal acceptance165 of the right to privacy never
encompassed a rejection of the individual’s right to record what was
already within the public space.166 Consent, privacy, and secrecy—at
least as applied in recording statutes167—were never protected. It
was only when the federal and state legislatures inappropriately
applied the Court’s jurisprudence regulating government conduct to
permissible individual conduct168 that this long-valued freedom was
ignored. In passing their respective recording statutes, legislators
infringed upon the eighty years worth of extensive acceptance of the
citizen’s ability to make permanent his or her observations in the
public realm with a mechanical device.
159. See generally id. at 71-73, 75-77, 89-93; Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 147.
160. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 152, at 205.
161. Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 149-50; see William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48
CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
162. Prosser, supra note 161, at 389.
163. Kreimer, supra note 55, at 352.
164. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
165. Richards & Solove, supra note 147, at 149-50 & n.191.
166. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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This liberty right is well-established on its own merits, but it also
arose from a more basic concept. Individuals are allowed to observe
—and record—those things in the public realm by natural means.
The following sets forth the longstanding American tradition of
protecting this natural recording process by evaluating that process
sequentially.
b. Natural Recording—Step 1: Matter Exists in Physical
Reality
In physical reality, all matter exists.169 Existence of matter is
defined, in its most reduced state, by the presence of elementary
particles.170 These elementary particles, being the “building blocks”
of all matter in physical reality,171 define the qualities and limits of
each thing’s physical existence.172 Matter therefore exists to the ex-
tent and in the manner that elementary particles form such matter.
This is how physical reality has existed since its inception.173 This
brief reflection on how things exist in physical reality merely
operates to establish that even the first step in the natural record-
ing sequence is of a fundamental character.
c. Natural Recording—Step 2: Humans Observe Things via
the Body
The composition of elementary particles constructs the innate
characteristics of any particular thing in physical reality. External
observations give those characteristics spatial and tangible rele-
vance to physical reality. A thing’s size is measured by how large it
169. This fundamental statement of existence should be accepted at face value. This Note
does not tread into philosophical discussions. See generally Edgar Sheffield Brightman,
Modern Idealism, 17 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 533, 537-38 (1920) (discussing
idealism); Lewis S. Feuer, Materialism, Idealism, and Science, 15 PHIL. SCI. 71, 71 (1948)
(book review) (discussing materialism).
170. COMM. ON ELEMENTARY-PARTICLE PHYSICS, ELEMENTARY-PARTICLE PHYSICS:
REVEALING THE SECRETS OF ENERGY AND MATTER 16-17, 19 (1998); HARALD FRITZSCH,
ELEMENTARY PARTICLES: BUILDING BLOCKS OF MATTER 7 (2005).
171. FRITZSCH, supra note 170, at 7-8.
172. See COMM. ON ELEMENTARY-PARTICLE PHYSICS, supra note 170, at 16-17.
173. Only humanity’s ability to know has changed. See FRITZSCH, supra note 170, at 2-7.
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looks; a thing’s weight is measured by how heavy it feels. The types
of measurement are vast and need not all be repeated here.
So, too, the method of observation varies. Some observations are
accomplished only by means that cannot be reproduced by human
faculties174 and are therefore foreign to the “natural” human expe-
rience. But humanity is well versed in its own methods of observa-
tion: humans have long understood their ability to use senses to
measure those things in physical reality.175 These senses allow the
human brain to use the body’s sensory receptors as a means to ob-
serve the innate characteristics of a thing’s existence.176 The process
is so innate to the operation of human existence that, like breathing,
it transcends the notion of tradition altogether. It is simply a part
of human existence.
Separate from—but related to—this process of acquisition is the
deprivation of the ability to perceive physical reality. In other soci-
eties, the cultural, religious, or social traditions may support such
sensory deprivation.177 But in America, methods of preventing
natural observation have long been antithetical to this nation’s
traditions and values. This is showcased when evaluating those
situations in which historically such deprivation was possible—as
perpetrated by fellow citizens, government actors, and government-
imposed punishment. The following discussion only underscores the
American tradition against sensory deprivation; it does not assert
that protecting the natural recording process was the specific
rationale underlying this tradition. Nevertheless, the tradition
against sensory deprivation signifies an embrace of principles that
are in accord with protecting natural observation.
Citizen conduct. American tradition has long held that the
conduct of private individuals that deprives fellow citizens of their
174. E.g., Shaun P. Collin, Electroreception in Vertebrates and Invertebrates, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 611, 611 (Michael Breed & Janice Moore eds., 2010)
(electric fields); Gerta Fleissner & Guenther Fleissner, Magnetoreception, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR, supra, at 324, 324 (magnetic fields).
175. See Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Demarcating the Five Senses, 80 PHIL. REV. 55, 55-56
& n.3 (1971).
176. See Maureen Connolly & Tom Craig, Stressed Embodiment: Doing Phenomenology in
the Wild, 25 HUM. STUD. 451, 453 (2002); Grant Gillett, Perception and Neuroscience, 40 BRIT.
J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 83, 84-85 (1989).
177. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia: Court Orders Eye to Be Gouged Out, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec.
10, 2005), http://www.hrw.org/news/2005/12/08/saudi-arabia-court-orders-eye-be-gouged-out.
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senses is unacceptable. This unwanted intrusion upon an individ-
ual’s bodily integrity has long been subject to the common law
action for battery.178 The Court has held this right out as the most
“sacred” and “carefully guarded[ ] by the common law.”179 Similarly,
the common law criminal prohibition against such deprivation was
established as “mayhem” early in English law, though narrowly
applied when the injury deprived the individual of the ability to
provide military assistance to the King.180 The Coventry Act of 1670
broadened “mayhem” beyond this focus on the ability to fight to
include any maiming or disfiguring of another.181 Historically,
nearly every American state adopted mayhem as a distinct statu-
tory offense, but over time it has largely been subsumed by other
statutory criminal offenses.182
Government actors. Government actors—typically police officers—
traditionally retain immunity from civil liability for tortious conduct
when lawfully discharging their duties.183 An equally longstanding
tradition holds these government agents liable for battery when
their conduct extends beyond the exercise of their duties.184
Measuring the permissibility of such conduct requires determining
if the force used against an individual was reasonably necessary.185
Therefore, American tradition has long held government actors
liable for depriving individuals of their senses when such conduct is
not reasonably necessary. What conduct is not reasonably necessary
is a fact-intensive question, but it is sufficient here for the purpose
of establishing the American tradition to acknowledge that some
government action resulting in sensory deprivation can lead to
liability for battery.186
178. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
179. Id. (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
180. Eugene R. Milhizer, Maiming as a Criminal Offense Under Military Law, ARMY LAW.,
May 1991, at 5, 5.
181. Id. at 6.
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 243 P. 359, 362 (Idaho 1925); Plummer v. State, 34 N.E. 968,
969 (Ind. 1893); Golden v. State, 1 S.C. 292, 297 (1870).
184. See Union Pac. R.R. Co., 141 U.S. at 251.
185. See, e.g., Wilson, 243 P. at 362; Plummer, 34 N.E. at 969; Zube v. Weber, 34 N.W. 264,
267 (Mich. 1887); Golden, 1 S.C. at 297.
186. See, e.g., Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302, 315 (6th Cir. 2009).
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Government-imposed punishment. In the early American colonies,
it was not altogether uncommon for criminal punishment to consist
of bodily mutilation, such as the removal or destruction of an of-
fender’s ears.187 But the 1791 ratification of the Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution188 prohibited the infliction of “cruel and unusual”
punishment.189 Prior to ratification, individual states used this
language to proscribe “the imposition of torture and other cruel
punishments.”190 The Court has applied this interpretation to the
Eighth Amendment text.191
Although the nature of the phrase “cruel and unusual” is am-
biguous,192 the debate over ratification of the Eighth Amendment is
telling. One congressman opposed ratification because the Amend-
ment threatened the then-accepted practice of cutting off ears as
criminal punishment.193 Rather than providing specific restraints on
punishmnents, the ratifiers implicitly accepted that such mutilation
would become unconstitutional.194 Not waiting for the Court to find
such punishment unconstitutional, the states themselves turned
away from such drastic corporal punishment. Beginning at the turn
of the nineteenth century, especially in the northern states, the
attitudes of legislatures across America began shifting away from
corporal punishment and public humiliation.195 And though there
were both regional exceptions and differing attitudes toward
slaves,196 the American tradition against punishment resulting in
sensory deprivation took root during the nation’s formative years.
The Court therefore had to catch up with state legislatures when
it finally reviewed punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In its
first decision directly concerning the constitutionality of a punish-
187. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 39-40 (1993).
188. Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 121 (2010).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See generally Catherine Rylyk, Lest We Regress to the Dark
Ages: Holding Voluntary Surgical Castration Cruel and Unusual, Even for Child Molesters,
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1305, 1307-10 (2008).
190. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 665 (1977).
191. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010) (dating back to 1879).
192. Rylyk, supra note 189, at 1310-11.
193. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 369 (1910).
194. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 666.
195. FRIEDMAN, supra note 187, at 74-76.
196. Id. at 81-82.
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ment,197 the Court recognized that “punishments of torture [leading
to death] and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty” are
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.198 Less than fifteen years
later, the Court recognized that the prohibition extended to bar-
barous methods of punishment,199 with some Justices focusing on
merely those punishments that “inflict[ed] ... acute pain and
suffering.”200 And by 1910, there was widespread recognition at the
state level that some corporal punishment, such as cutting off limbs
and ears, would be unconstitutional.201
Considering the above, it is therefore apparent that, from
America’s infancy, this nation has valued the protection of the
individual’s natural ability to use the body as a vehicle to observe
physical reality. Historically, the common law has provided citizens
with both civil and criminal recourse against fellow citizens who
deprive them of this ability.202 Starting shortly after America’s
founding and evolving in the next century, the public—and then the
Court—rejected the imposition of punishments resulting in sensory
deprivation.203 The recognition that government actors, outside of
the punishment context, cannot deprive a citizen of her ability to
observe physical reality unless such conduct is within the reason-
able exercise of government duties is equally longstanding.204 The
focus here is on the actual protection against sensory deprivation;
this Note does not presume to project any rationale for that pro-
tection. And the expansive scope and history of this protection
establishes that the second step in the natural recording process has
long been enshrined in American history and tradition.
197. Rylyk, supra note 189, at 1311.
198. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878).
199. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
200. O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
201. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 406-07 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
202. See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 187-201 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
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d. Natural Recording—Step 3: Humans Record Observations
via Memory
The final sequence of recording is the act of making the obser-
vation permanent. “Permanent” simply means “[t]o continue
indefinitely” until “change [is] made,” but is not to be conflated or
confused with forever, perpetual, or for any “fixed or certain” time-
frame.205 As the body provides the mind a vehicle to observe
reality,206 the human mind enables the individual’s “self” to keep
those observations permanent.207 The mind therefore records
observations by the natural method of memory.
Natural recording is more deeply engrained in American values
than even the longstanding protection of the ability to observe. As
John Locke once recognized, “the inward persuasion of the mind ...
cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force.”208
The protection against government control of the individual’s mind
was fundamental and widespread during the time when there were
no means by which the government could pervade the individual’s
mind.209 This inability indicates why, as a practical matter, there
existed no common law or statutory prohibition against such gov-
ernment intrusion.210 Nevertheless, the sanctity of the mind was a
core value enshrined in the Constitution. The Court has repeatedly
acknowledged the freedom of thought as “the matrix ... of nearly
every ... form of [constitutional] freedom.”211 The freedom of thought,
and thus necessarily the freedom of memory, is one of the few
fundamental American freedoms upon which there is extensive—
perhaps near universal—agreement.212
205. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 935 (3d ed. 1969).
206. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
207. See Leslie G. Ungerleider, Functional Brain Imaging Studies of Cortical Mechanisms
for Memory, 270 SCIENCE 769, 771-74 (1995).
208. LOCKE, supra note 132, at 219.
209. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive
Enhancement and the Constitution, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1049, 1051-52.
210. Id. at 1051.
211. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
212. See Blitz, supra note 209, at 1051-52 & nn.4, 6-7. Contra Evangeline Wright, Note,
Mind-Control Experimentation: A Travesty of Human Rights in the United States, 9 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 211, 213-29 (2005).
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e. The Tradition of Natural Recording Extends to Mechanical
Recording
The history of American culture regarding the natural recording
process213 shows a longstanding tradition of holding the protection
of the process in high regard. The remaining question, then, is
whether this deeply rooted value can appropriately be extended to
mechanical recording due to the substantial similarity between the
two different modes of recording. To resolve this issue, the recording
methods must be compared.
Because a video camera records a vast array of types of observa-
tions, it is perhaps the best representative of a mechanical device
that records.214 The video camera’s basic operation utilizes technol-
ogy to replicate the natural human methods of observation and
recording.215 The core concepts of observation and recording are
therefore the same for both natural and mechanical recording. The
substance of the recording—those objects in physical reality—is also
shared between the two methods of recording. The broad concept
and application of these two recording methods are therefore
substantially similar. What potentially distinguishes the two meth-
ods are any differences in their nature and application.
Format. One obvious distinction between the two methods of
recording is the format of recording. Natural recording utilizes the
body and mind,216 whereas mechanical recording uses magnetism,
digital devices, electrical charges, and a host of other means accom-
plished by scientific development.217 This alone does not present a
compelling argument to distinguish the two for these purposes.
Mechanical recording, to the extent it is a replication of the natural
process by alternative means, captures only what is readily observ-
able by human senses and not that which is otherwise imperceptible
213. See supra Part III.C.2.b-d.
214. The “right to record by mechanical device,” however, encompasses devices that record
less than a video camera and future devices that may record additional sensory observations.
215. See ALAN P. KEFAUVER, THE AUDIO RECORDING HANDBOOK 1-2, 9, 20, 28-29, 273 (2001)
(auditory recording parallels); HERBERT ZETTL, VIDEO BASICS 6, at 53-60 (2010) (natural
vision parallels).
216. See supra notes 175-76, 207 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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by humans.218 The mechanical format, when it replicates the natural
process, does not change the substance of the physical reality that
is being recorded.
Limitations. The scope of recording can be limited in both dura-
tion and focus,219 and mechanical issues may undermine the clarity
of the recorded observation.220 Conversely, natural recording is
associated with more inclusive observation, whereby the recorded
observation is not undermined by such technological limitations.
These issues of limitation speak to the quality of the mechanical
recording, which should be vulnerable to questions of reliability.
This does not mark a distinction but instead parallels similar issues
associated with natural recording.221 For example, in litigation, the
credibility of natural memory—including the perceptive, quality,
and communicative aspects—is open to attack by counsel under the
Federal Rules of Evidence.222 These potential deficiencies in re-
cording are therefore common to natural and mechanical recordings.
Bias and manipulation. A recording is one person’s observations
made permanent. That person’s recording is inherently the conse-
quence of the individual’s subjective bias.223 The fundamental right
here is to use mechanical recording to make permanent the bias
which would otherwise be captured by natural recording. The right
is not predicated on providing a more objective record than what a
natural recording could present. Instead, the two methods of re-
cording reflect the same bias.224 Similarly, the recording can be
subject to conscious and unconscious manipulation.225 Once again,
this does not distinguish between the methods of recording as they
are both subject to this type of misuse. These qualities, like the limi-
tations of mechanical recording, are merely factors that should be
considered when evaluating the recording’s credibility and reliabil-
ity.
218. See supra notes 174-76, 214-15 and accompanying text.
219. See Wasserman, supra note 57, at 631.
220. See, e.g., Jessica M. Silbey, Cross-Examining Film, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 17, 34 (2008).
221. See id. at 29-31.
222. See 3 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 6:75(2)
(3d ed. 2007).
223. See Silbey, supra note 220, at 18.
224. See id. at 29-31.
225. See id. at 26-31.
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Audience interpretation. It is possible that the above issues, or
even the viewer’s own bias,226 may implicate problems of interpreta-
tion. Issues of interpretation are pertinent only to subsequent
viewing of the observations. As such, these issues are beyond the
scope of recording those observations. To any degree audience
interpretation actually differs between the two methods of record-
ing, this difference does not distinguish natural from mechanical
recordings within the boundaries of the fundamental right.
Legal fiction. Mechanical recording that captures the same
physical reality as a citizen’s observations is not actually that
individual’s natural observations and recording. It is instead a
substitute—one that might not precisely capture what the individ-
ual observed and, indeed, may capture more than what the individ-
ual observed. These are two legitimate distinctions to make. But
neither is substantial enough to distinguish the two methods of
recording for the purposes here.
First, the “actual difference” distinction is not a significant dis-
tinction between the two methods. The physical reality that can be
recorded is the same,227 regardless of the method of recording. And
courts routinely recognize that mechanical recording, notwith-
standing any manipulation, is an objective record of that physical
reality.228 So the mechanical recording is merely a change to a more
objective perspective of the physical reality that is recorded. The
change in perspective does not alter the fact that both methods
record the same substance, and therefore it does not adequately
distinguish the two methods.
Second, the “greater quantity of recorded material” distinction is
not one that separates these two methods to any substantive degree.
Because of the presence of both the individual and the mechanical
device, both recording methods have the potential and ability to
record the exact same observations. Indeed, the nature of the right
is one whereby the mechanical device captures something that the
individual’s natural recording also observed.229 Otherwise, the me-
226. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and
the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903 (2009).
227. See supra text accompanying notes 216-18.
228. Wasserman, supra note 57, at 630-31; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379
(2007).
229. See infra Part III.C.4.
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chanical method does not follow from the natural method as a
supplement, but instead operates to replace the individual’s natural
recording altogether. Therefore, everything that is recorded by the
mechanical device could also be naturally recorded. Happenstance
and circumstantial arbitrariness may alter the precise substance of
the recordings. Mere chance is not given so much weight that the
methods of recording can be said to be entirely distinct when the
mechanical recording includes additional material that was
available to be captured—but unsuccessfully acquired—by natural
recording. The additional substance of a mechanical recording is
merely a contextual frame to the shared observations of natural and
mechanical recording.
This final difference suggests an important practical application
of the right. If a recording made by a mechanical device is not
actually a citizen’s observations, then the law must decide to what
degree it is acceptable for the device’s observations to be an ade-
quate supplement to the citizen’s actual experiences. The extremes,
as they often are, are easily ascertained. If a mechanical recording
is made from a device in the individual’s physical control, the device
is acting as a supplemental method to the individual’s natural re-
cording process. In direct contrast, a mechanical device that records
observations when the private citizen is not present does not
supplement that individual’s natural recording. It is an observation
and recording that the private citizen had no occasion to acquire by
natural means, and therefore is beyond that witness’s right to
record. The open question is at what point a mechanical recording
device is no longer a supplement to, but rather a substitution of, the
witness’s natural ability to record via memory.
Practical considerations suggest that the right to record should
not be limited to devices that are only on the citizen’s person. Issues
of ability and safety sometimes prevent such recording. And simply
removing the device from the citizen’s person does not provide the
type of unacceptable substitution falling outside of the right to
record. As long as the device is within the citizen’s constructive pos-
session while that individual is actually present, the device is
operating at a sufficient level of supplementation instead of substi-
tution. The debate over what constitutes constructive possession is
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merely acknowledged here without being resolved, as that issue is
better treated by other commentators and the courts.230
In considering the above, differences between the two methods of
recording certainly do exist. These differences, however, are not of
such a degree as to significantly distinguish the two methods. The
deeply rooted American tradition, devoted to preserving natural
recording, can therefore be appropriately extended to the right to
record by mechanical device. This extension not only underscores
the inappropriate reversal of the treatment of mechanical recording
following Katz231 but also further fixes the fundamental nature of
the right to record by mechanical device. 
3. All Things Within Public Space
The right of a private citizen to mechanically record is limited to
those observations within public space. There is a basic divide
between the public and private spheres.232 Pertaining to the right to
record, this distinction between the public and private can be
tracked along notions of property rights. The Court heralded the
right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property”233 and added
that the right to exclude is “universally held to be a fundamental
element of the property right.”234 It is this element—the ability to
exclude—that helps distinguish the physical boundaries of the right
to record. Indeed, this tracks the boundaries of the right recognized
before the states incorrectly relied upon Katz to modify their re-
cording statutes.235
The right to record therefore does not extend to those locations in
which the owner is not a government actor and has the ability to
exclude members of the public who otherwise wish to exercise their
230. See, e.g., Benjamin C. McMurray, Hands Off the Gun! A Critique of United States v.
Jameson and Constructive Possession Law in the Tenth Circuit, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 536-
39, 551-62 (2008); George H. Singer, Note, Constructive Possession of Controlled Substances:
A North Dakota Look at a Nationwide Problem, 68 N.D. L. REV. 981, 1001-02 (1992).
231. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
232. See generally Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical
Perspective, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 183-84 (2010).
233. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979).
234. Id. at 179-80.
235. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
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constitutional rights.236 Because the private owner decides what
“sticks” are bundled with the right of entry onto her property, the
owner retains the discretion to decide if exercising the right to
record is allowed. This cleanly inserts the right to record into this
nation’s system of compatible constitutional rights envisioned by
the Framers.237
4. Legally Observable by a Private Citizen
The private citizen’s ability to move freely about the public sphere
has never been absolute. Both historically and in modern times, this
right has been restrained by public nuisance laws,238 loitering
laws,239 and other state statutes.240 If the Court recognized a citi-
zen’s right to freely move in the public space,241 it would not derive
from the citizen’s right to record. The right to record merely enables
citizens to mechanically record what can be naturally observed. And
the ability to naturally observe is restricted by the individual’s
ability to move within public space.
Traditional protections of natural recording make apparent which
public observations and recordings fall within the right to record.
Natural observation has been protected from government infringe-
ment that exceeds the reasonable exercise of government duties.242
This history of natural observation shares a general principle with
the constitutional right to mechanically record: that some govern-
ment deprivation is impermissible. To this end, the right to record
offers some degree of protection of public observation and recording
from direct deprivation. The difference is the test evaluating what
infringement is permissible. The “reasonable exercise” test was used
236. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text; cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551, 567-70 (1972).
237. See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 570.
238. See Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining
Rational Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 543-48 (2006).
239. See Angela L. Clark, Note, City of Chicago v. Morales: Sacrificing Individual Liberty
Interests for Community Safety, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 115-26 (1999).
240. See, e.g., Kathryn E. Wilhelm, Note, Freedom of Movement at a Standstill? Toward the
Establishment of a Fundamental Right to Intrastate Travel, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2461, 2480-92
(2010).
241. See id. at 2469-80.
242. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
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when the observation was not a sequential part of a constitutional
right. Because the right to record is a fundamental right, direct
deprivations should be subject not to a reasonable exercise analysis
but rather to strict scrutiny review.243
Related to direct deprivation is the ability of government actors
to prohibit mechanical recording by dictating that an individual may
not legally be within a public space. This indirectly frustrates the
right to record by depriving the citizen of the ability to record spec-
ific public observations. Because there is no fundamental right to
freedom of movement in public space, and the right to record does
not include such a right,244 these spatial constraints implicate two
separate levels of review. Such constraints are valid as an internal
mechanism of the right, and therefore are not an infringement, only
to the extent the restriction targets a legitimate purpose other than
infringing the right to record. If the location restriction is imple-
mented to specifically target the right to record, rather than inci-
dentally, then the restriction is akin to direct deprivation and
subject to a strict scrutiny review.
D. Subsequent Steps of the Substantive Due Process Analysis
Finding that there is a fundamental right to record is not the end
of substantive due process analysis. The remainder of this Note
reflects on the additional steps that will need to be addressed in liti-
gation to protect the right to record from government infringement.
1. The Fundamental Liberty Interest Must Be Substantially
Infringed
The liberty interest may be impinged in a number of ways. State
legislatures may pass recording statutes that directly prohibit a
citizen from fully exercising her right to record.245 Police also use
broad, “catchall” criminal statutes to deter citizen recording.246 Even
when a legislature has refrained from prohibiting a citizen from
243. See infra Part III.D.2.
244. See supra notes 238-41 and accompanying text.
245. See supra Part I.
246. Kreimer, supra note 55, at 361-62.
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exercising the right to record, other state actors have taken it upon
themselves to infringe upon the right simply because it is being
exercised. Citizens are subjected to arrests and threats of arrest for
recording in public even when there are inadequate legal grounds
for such arrests.247
These situations either prevent the private citizen from exercising
the fundamental right or punish the citizen for having exercised the
right. Not only does this harm the individual who seeks to exercise
the right, but it also deters other citizens from exercising the
right.248 As a result, each situation presents a substantial infringe-
ment of the right to record. Judicial intervention is therefore
permitted and necessary.
2. The Infringement Cannot Survive Strict Scrutiny
Government infringement upon individual liberty will survive
only if it satisfies the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. The level
of scrutiny depends upon the liberty interest at issue. If no consti-
tutional right has been substantially impinged, the court will em-
ploy only a rational basis standard of review.249 To survive rational
basis review, all that must be shown is a legitimate state interest,
achieved by rationally related means.250 But the liberty interest here
is a fundamental right, and as such would be entitled to heightened
protection. Infringement upon a fundamental constitutional right is
subject to strict scrutiny.251 Strict scrutiny requires that the state
not only have a compelling government interest but also that the
means be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.252
Determining what government interests are sufficiently impor-
tant to be “compelling” is an opaque process.253 The related analysis
—determining if the means are narrowly tailored to that compelling
247. Id. at 363-66.
248. Id. at 366.
249. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 766 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
250. See id. at 728 (majority opinion).
251. Id. at 766-67 (Souter, J., concurring).
252. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1283-84, 1315-16 (2007).
253. See Fallon, supra note 252, at 1321-25.
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interest—similarly employs a variety of ambiguous mechanisms
that may substantially impact a court’s decision.254 Although the
process is recognized here, a competent and thorough strict scrutiny
analysis of the infringements on the right to record is well beyond
the scope of this Note. Though only a cursory foray into this analysis
will be provided, it must be noted that strict scrutiny is a difficult
standard for the government to satisfy.255
The legislative constraints on the right to record—consent, pri-
vacy, and secrecy256—are, in their most broadly conceived notions,
possibly compelling state interests. When these interests are
narrowed in terms of what type of consent, privacy, and secrecy the
state seeks to protect from recording, the “compelling” nature loses
much of its luster.
Concerns regarding harassment and public safety are most
certainly compelling state interests and could justify restricting the
ability of all citizens to record in public.257 Accepting this as true,
however, fails to resolve the problem that none of the methods of
infringement are narrowly tailored to achieve these compelling
interests. Admittedly, this analysis is far from thorough. But it
provides a glimpse of the strict scrutiny analysis of these infringe-
ments upon the fundamental right to record.
CONCLUSION
There exists a fundamental, yet unrecognized, right for a private
citizen to record with a mechanical device all things within public
space that can be legally observed by that individual. This right is
deeply rooted in tradition and implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. It was a liberty interest first established in 1884 and later
developed by both common and statutory law until it was inappro-
priately restricted by misguided legislatures eighty years later. The
right is further established as fundamental due to its substantial
254. See id. at 1326-32.
255. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV., 793, 806-08 (2006) (collecting authority of
the “widely accepted” notion that strict scrutiny is “fatal in fact”); id. at 862-64 (“Overall, the
strict scrutiny survival rate [of statutes] in fundamental rights cases is 24 [percent].”).
256. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
257. See Kreimer, supra note 55, at 364-66.
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relation to the longstanding American tradition of valuing and
protecting natural recording.
The scope of the right is limited by the development of America’s
traditions. Nonetheless, both legislative and executive conduct has
infringed upon the right and the judiciary has, to an alarming
degree, allowed such infringement. Although proponents of the right
have utilized First Amendment doctrine, it has proven to be unre-
liable and insufficient to protect the full extent of the right to record.
As this Note has suggested, courts and litigants should instead look
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process to fully
protect the fundamental right to record.
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